SSL VPN Deployment Considerations by Trinity Security Services

Now we have discussed some of the advantages to SSL VPNs and have an understanding of how they operate, it is important to look at some of the deployment considerations (or in some ways disadvantages) of SSL VPNs.



Client Security – Because SSL VPN offers a much greater choice of
client platform with ‘clientless’ or ‘near clientless’ operation,
the security of any client connecting to the network must be heavily scrutinised.
For example, in no way would any organisation consider a PC in an Internet café
to be as trusted as a corporate issued laptop. Based on this assumption, vendors
have developed several mechanisms to boost the trust associated with an un-trusted
client connection. Some of these are outlined below:



Client integrity scanning – When a client connects to the VPN a
small java applet is downloaded to the client which searches for good or bad
files, process or ports listening. For example, it can check for a running AV
program with current definitions, the presence of a personal firewall with a
standard rule set or the presence of any known Trojans. The disadvantage of
this mechanism is it may place limitations on the types of clients that can
connect, but more importantly, it is only a onetime snapshot of a system. Also
with an understanding or the rule set, it seems feasible that these checks could
be fooled.



Sandbox - A sandbox is used to store any files downloaded from a corporate
network over the SSL VPN. Once the VPN session is terminated, the contents of
the sandbox are securely deleted. This avoids issues of email attachments and
corporate data being accidentally left on un-trusted machines. Sandboxes can
also be used to ensure Citrix Metaframe or other interactive session data is
wiped from a machine at logoff.



Secure logoff and credential wiping – This ensures that when users
logoff the system, all logon credentials are wiped form the client machine.
Of course, with an enterprise strength VPN solution, a strong authentication
solution should also be used to protect credentials further.



Timeouts and re-authentication – To avoid systems being left connected
to the network by users, sessions can be terminated after periods of inactivity.
Also, to ensure the correct user is still using the connection, periodic authentication
during a session can be implemented on some systems.



Virus, malicious code and worm activity – Because the client is
nearly un-trusted, most SSL VPNs can also filter traffic at the application
level (especially if an application level proxy is used, rather than a protocol
redirector), blocking worms and viruses at the gateway.



Audit and Activity awareness - Any security appliance, hardware or software
system should include a good level of auditing. With SSL VPN this functionality
is seen as key, because of the relatively simple systems needed to abuse an
SSL VPN by a remote hacker (I.e. A web browser), should logon credentials become
compromised. Further to this, some form of real time alerting of unusual actions
(such as trying to copy an entire disk over the VPN) must be included. Some
of this functionality is seen as less key by vendors and is still evolving.



Application support – The major block to deployment of SSL VPNs
is likely to be application support. As SSL works at the boundary of layers
4 and 5, each application must support its use. Vendors add additional support
through the use of protocol redirectors, but these often require some user knowledge
to operate. Based on this, the first step to take when designing an SSL VPN
solution is to look at the access that will be required and assess how simple
this will be to provide.



Internal Network Security Failings – Using IPSec VPN, a large number
of organisations allocate specific IP addresses to remote clients using the
Radius Protocol. This gives the ability to filer and control traffic based on
source IP, ensuring internal network security. Because all sessions from an
SSL VPN are normally proxied from a single address, all clients sessions originate
from this single IP. This means, a network administrator is unable to allocate
privileges using source IP addressing. In reality, this level of control can
be handled on the SSL VPN gateway, but if a network is already configured for
source IP based security, the overhead of altering is can be very high.

Conclusions

SSL VPNs used for remote access, without doubt, have significant advantages
over the IPSec alternatives. But alongside these advantages they also offer
added complexity, which must be weighed up against the advantages. Before considering
an SSL VPN deployment you should consider:

1. Can I accept or mitigate the security risks involved?

2. What will I gain from the added mobility and flexibility?

3. Which protocols do I need to support?

If all these questions can be answered, it may be time to start looking at
which vendors can offer the best solution. One interesting point in relation
to SSL VPN solutions is that most vendors (all but a few at the current time)
consider SSL based VPNs to be separate from their IPSec counterparts in terms
of hardware and software. If your network manager tends to follow rather than
lead the trend, I suggest they will be looking for a solution which offers a
complete VPN solution, offering both SSL and IPSec on a single system.

As nearly all vendors see SSL VPN as additional to IPSec VPN, rather than a
replacement, we can conclude the SSL VPN is not “the new definition of
secure remote access”, but a complimentary solution to IPSec.

Finally, if you are not considering SSL VPN deployment, you should certainly
consider the effect that SSL VPNs are already having on your network. Are contractors,
consultants or employees bypassing your security controls by tunnelling their
traffic out of your organisation over your SSL VPN? Is the use of SSL VPNs covered
in your security policies and standards?

Click here to read part
1 of this article.

Click here to read part
2 of this article.


About the Author:

Waheed Warden, MCIM, Channel Marketing Manager, Trinity Security Services

Waheed.Warden@trinitysecurity.com

http://www.trinitysecurity.com


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